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Abstract 
 
Rules that require actors to make their finances transparent have become a key part of the anti-
corruption toolkit, under the assumption that sunlight is the best disinfectant.  This logic 
underpinned the creation, in 2002, of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), an 
international club aimed at reducing corruption in oil, gas and mining.  The initiative has proved 
popular, with 16 countries now EITI compliant and 23 others having achieved candidate status.  
However, as a soft law standard to which countries voluntarily commit, EITI presents a paradox: 
why would corrupt governments voluntarily expose themselves to sunlight?  Does its popularity 
imply that it is meaningless?  We argue that governments join because they are concerned about 
their reputation with international donors and expect to be rewarded by increased aid.  Our 
quantitative analysis demonstrates that countries do gain access to increased aid the further they 
progress through the EITI implementation process.  However, we also find that EITI achieves real 
results in terms of reducing corruption.   We suggest that this is because EITI requires countries to 
build multi-stakeholder institutions which improve accountability, and provide qualitative evidence 
about how this has worked in several countries.   
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Resource-rich countries tend to perform poorly in terms of economic development despite their 
natural wealth (Auty, 1993, Karl, 1997).  Some scholars attribute this ‘resource curse’ partly to high 
levels of corruption (Sala-I-Martin and Subramanian, 2008, Mehlum et al., 2006, Robinson et al., 
2006).  Indeed, many countries that are rich in oil, gas and mineral resources are perceived to be 
highly corrupt, according to widely used measures such as the Transparency International 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), while the extractive industries are regarded as among the most 
corrupt areas in international business.1  It is therefore not surprising that the extractive industries 
have been the target of many anti-corruption measures in recent years.  Many of these efforts have 
focused on transparency initiatives, which have become a key part of the anti-corruption toolkit on 
the assumption that sunlight is the best disinfectant.  Thus, in August 2012, the United States 
imposed transparency requirements on oil, gas and mining companies to fulfill a section of the 2010 
Dodd-Frank Act, requiring them to disclose payments made to foreign governments.2  The 
European Union introduced similar changes in June 2013 as part of a review of its accounting 
directive.  
 
However, these ‘hard law’ requirements aimed at companies were preceded by a ‘soft law’ project 
aimed at changing the behavior of the governments of resource-rich countries.  Launched in 2002, 
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) seeks to reduce corruption in oil, gas and 
mining by persuading governments to make revenues earned in these sectors transparent.  It grew 
out of the Publish What You Pay campaign, a global network of civil society organizations (CSOs) 
campaigning for transparency in the extractive industries. 3  Countries that sign up to EITI commit to 
publishing government revenues from the extractive industries and requiring companies that 
operate on their territory to do the same.  Any discrepancies are revealed and must be reconciled 
ahead of the publication of the EITI Report.  This transparency on both sides of the business 
relationship is expected to deter corruption and, therefore, increase the likelihood of revenues being 
spent in ways that contribute to social and economic well-being, particularly in developing countries 
(Ölcer, 2009). 
 
                                               
1
 On the TI Bribe Payers Index 2011, mining is ranked 15
th
 most corrupt out of 19 sectors while oil and gas is ranked 16th.  
Mining scores 6.3, oil and gas 6.2, where a maximum score of 10 corresponds with the view that companies from that 
country never bribe abroad and a zero corresponds with the view that they always do.  
2
 US oil and mining companies were to be required to disclose payments of taxes and other fees in excess of $100,000 
made to foreign governments.   However, on 2 July 2013 the DC District Court gave a summary judgement vacating this 
portion of the Dodd-Frank Act.  
3
 See http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/  
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The initiative has proved extremely popular, with 23 countries now rated as EITI compliant, 16 
having attained candidate status and many others having signaled their commitment to 
implementing EITI (see Table 1 below).  However, as a soft law organization, to which countries 
voluntarily commit, the Initiative’s popularity is a puzzle: why would corrupt governments voluntarily 
expose themselves to sunlight and thereby forgo future corrupt revenues?  Does the Initiative’s 
success in attracting members imply that it is meaningless and hence that it does not achieve its 
aim of reducing corruption?   
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Table 1.  Countries at different stages of implementation 
 
 
Intent to Implement      Candidate Status          Compliant 
Australia Afghanistan Albania 
Brazil Cameroon Azerbaijan 
Colombia Chad Burkina Faso  
France Democratic Rep. of Congo* Central African Republic* 
Myanmar Guatemala Cote d’Ivoire 
Ukraine Guinea Ghana 
United Kingdom Honduras Iraq 
United States Indonesia Kyrgyz Republic 
 Kazakhstan Liberia 
 Madagascar* Mali 
 Sao Tome & Principe Mauritania 
 Sierra Leone* Mongolia 
 Solomon Islands Mozambique 
 Tajikistan Niger 
 Philippines Nigeria 
 Trinidad & Tobago Norway 
  Peru 
  Republic of the Congo 
  Tanzania 
  Timor-Leste 
  Togo 
  Yemen* 
  Zambia 
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Our research contributes to the literature on how the establishment of voluntary standards systems 
that allow actors to demonstrate commitment to an emerging international norm – in this case, 
transparency - can regulate the behavior of governments.  Voluntary private regulation is becoming 
increasingly common, particularly in the area of environmental standards.  However, EITI has an 
unusual governance structure in that it requires three parties - governments, companies and civil 
society organizations - to implement standards together.  EITI engages this tripartite group in 
“regulatory standard-setting” (RSS) in an effort to fill perceived gaps in state and international 
regulation, effectively contracting out a small area of policy-making to the multi-stakeholder group.  
The closest relatives of EITI in terms of global regulatory institutions include the International Labor 
Organization Declaration on Multinational Enterprises, the Kimberley Process on conflict diamond 
trade and the Apparel Industry Partnership (Abbott, 2009).   
 
We suggest that, although EITI implementation is voluntary, governments are motivated to make 
this commitment because they seek to improve their reputation with the international community.  
This, in turn, brings tangible benefits, since states that are regarded as behaving in line with 
international norms are often rewarded by other international actors.  Specifically, we argue that 
many resource-rich governments are motivated to join EITI at least partly by the promise of 
increased foreign aid.  We put forward evidence that governments perceive that they are offered 
such rewards and demonstrate that such benefits are forthcoming when they commit.  We qualify 
this by arguing that it is only for a certain set of countries that the expected benefits of joining 
outweigh the costs of implementation.  EITI may be a particularly easy win for countries that are 
only moderately corrupt or that are perceived to be more corrupt than they really are.  The promise 
of aid commands much weaker leverage in countries that are wealthier and less dependent on aid.   
 
Despite the fact that commitment to EITI reflects instrumental behaviour, we also argue that EITI 
achieves real results in terms of reducing corruption in the countries that join.  We analyse how 
corruption levels (as measured by CPI country scores) improve after countries sign up to EITI, both 
over time and in comparison to matched-pair countries that do not join.  We argue that EITI works 
because of the nature of the implementation process and the way in which it improves the capacity 
of civil society to hold governments to account, whether governments like it or not.   
 
The paper proceeds as follows.  First, we set out our argument and hypotheses about why 
countries join EITI, and report our findings in this area.  Second, we develop a theoretical argument 
for how implementation might result in reduced corruption.   We then present the data and methods 
by which we test this hypothesis, before reporting our results.   Third, although we acknowledge the 
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difficulty of demonstrating that EITI implementation causes a reduction in corruption, we seek to 
improve the robustness of our results by conducting another check on the mechanism by which we 
expect this relationship to occur, i.e., by testing how accountability levels mediate the effects of EITI 
implementation on corruption levels.  Our conclusions draw out key implications relating to how 
third-party benchmarks can be used to refine aid conditionality, the role of transparency initiatives in 
reducing corruption, and the conditions necessary for EITI to retain its transformative power in the 
future. 
 
THE PROCESS OF EITI IMPLEMENTATION 
 
For national governments, the process of joining EITI – or becoming EITI compliant – involves 
fulfilling criteria so as to progress through three defined stages: commitment, candidacy, and 
compliance (see Figure 1).4  Governments first signal their ‘commitment to implement’ by making a 
public announcement that they wish to join EITI.  They then work towards obtaining the status of 
‘candidate’.   To become a candidate, countries must meet five sign-up requirements.  In addition to 
making a ‘commitment to implement’ – i.e., an unequivocal public statement of intention to 
implement EITI, they must commit to work with civil society and companies on the implementation 
process, appoint a senior individual to lead on EITI implementation, and establish a multi-
stakeholder group to oversee the implementation.  The multi-stakeholder group should include – but 
is not limited to – the private sector, civil society (not only NGOs but also the media and 
parliamentarians) and relevant government ministries (including the individual appointed to lead 
implementation).  Finally, the multi-stakeholder group, in consultation with key EITI stakeholders, 
should agree and publish a fully costed work plan, containing measurable targets, a timetable for 
implementation, and an assessment of capacity constraints.  The country should detail how it has 
met these criteria when it formally applies to become an EITI member.  Once the country has 
completed these steps, an Outreach and Candidature Committee of the EITI Board assesses the 
application and makes a recommendation to the Board, which ultimately decides whether the 
country has met the conditions for becoming a candidate.  
 
 
 
                                               
4
 We use the term ‘joining’ EITI as a shorthand for engaging in the implementation process in any way, where the 
particular stage of implementation is not relevant. 
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Figure 1. The EITI implementation process 
 
 
Countries can hold candidate status for a maximum of two-and-a-half years, during which time they 
undergo a ‘validation’ process.  This involves meeting a further 15 criteria, which functionally 
prepare the government and relevant companies to be able to disclose payments based on 
accounts audited to international standards, and to be able to disseminate their reports and 
encourage public debate.  The publication of a report is not itself one of the criteria and indeed 
some countries publish their first EITI reports after achieving compliance.5  However, many of the 
other criteria centre on the process for producing and checking the contents of the report.  For 
example, the multi-stakeholder group must appoint a ‘reconciler’ to compare the payments received 
by the government with those made by companies and to account for any discrepancies.  It must 
also put in place processes for resolving discrepancies, acting on lessons learnt and ensuring that 
EITI implementation is sustainable.  Once it has met the 15 criteria, the EITI Board declares the 
country to be ‘compliant’.  However, countries can lose their compliant status at any point if they 
cease to adhere to any of the 21 requirements (the five sign-up requirements, the 15 
implementation requirements, and a commitment to maintain adherence to all requirements). EITI 
has proved highly popular.  Table 1 shows the countries that have achieved each of the stages of 
implementation as of September 2013.   
 
 
                                               
5
 This is partly a historical artefact.  When EITI was first established, the publication of the first report was the main 
objective of countries that committed to implementation.  It is only since 2007 that the formal stages of candidacy and 
compliance have been introduced. 
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WHY DO GOVERNMENTS JOIN EITI? 
 
EITI implementation requires governments to voluntarily subject themselves to a significant degree 
of scrutiny.  For any government, undertaking the validation process is an onerous commitment and 
success is not guaranteed, raising questions as to what expected benefits outweigh these costs.  
Even for countries where corruption levels are perceived to be low - such as some of the countries 
that have most recently signaled their intent to implement the standard, including the United States, 
the United Kingdom and France, for example – the implementation process is costly and time-
consuming.  However, for high-corruption countries, this puzzle is acute, since EITI implementation 
increases the risk that their corruption will be exposed and that they will subsequently have to give 
up a highly lucrative stream of private gain. This raises the question, why do so many (high-
corruption) countries seek to join EITI?  Yet join they do.  Of the 23 countries that have achieved 
compliance, 20 have a CPI score of 40 or less, on a scale where 0 means that a country is 
perceived as highly corrupt and 100 means that a country is perceived as very clean.6 
 
One answer is that the emergence of oil-sector transparency as an international norm, itself driven 
by the reputational concerns of several high-profile actors (Gillies, 2010), has changed the costs 
and benefits of engaging in corruption versus building a reputation for seeking to improve 
governance.  Given the widespread consensus that corruption is detrimental to economic 
development (Mauro, 1995, Bardhan, 1997, Rose-Ackerman, 1999, Hodge et al., 2011), donors, 
lenders, companies (at least, clean companies, for whom bribe demands represent an unwelcome 
cost), and citizens have long had an interest in reducing corruption.  
 
The spread of transparency as a norm has meant that governments generally make much more 
information available about their activities and their finances, while the media and civil society 
demand far greater access to such information.  The ‘right’ to information about public spending and 
public policy is increasingly enshrined in Freedom of Information Acts, for example, while the Open 
Government Partnership has seen 64 countries making a commitment to more transparent and 
accountable government.  Grigorescu suggests that political elites thus realize that they no longer 
have a monopoly over information and that their societies will receive information about them 
directly from other sources (Grigorescu, 2003).  They might calculate that they have less to lose 
from making a commitment to transparency, or at least that transparency is inevitable.   
                                               
6
 See Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2012, http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/in_detail.  
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At the same time, some actors in the international community have begun to offer explicit incentives 
to governments in exchange for commitments to greater transparency.  Donors and lenders face an 
asymmetric information problem regarding a government’s capacity and intent to use aid for agreed 
purposes or re-pay loans on time.  They have learned that giving money to countries with poor 
governance rarely pays (Collier et al., 1997, Freytag and Pehnelt, 2009, Presbitero, 2009). As a 
result, many countries and international organisations now condition lending and aid on anti-
corruption provisions.  This has long been the case for the World Bank and IMF, while the OECD’s 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) also requires the inclusion of anti-corruption provisions 
in aid-funded bilateral procurement contracts (Sandholtz and Gray, 2003).   However, these 
provisions are not easy to monitor or enforce.  Donors and lenders need a more reliable method for 
monitoring and judging whether a country is serious about improving governance or fighting 
corruption.   
 
To date, the main tools used by donors have been indices based on perceptions and experience of 
corruption, such as the CPI and the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI).  These 
‘reputational intermediaries’ provide information about a country’s track record on controlling 
corruption and help shape expectations about how the country will behave in future.  Eigen writes 
that, “donor nations and institutions are constantly on the lookout for signals of improved 
governance as they seek to protect and give good account for the usage of their taxpayers’ money” 
(Eigen, 2006-07).  Indeed, research suggests that countries with good governance according to 
these indicators are ‘rewarded’ by the international community through increased foreign aid, while 
governments that are perceived to be corrupt typically receive less foreign aid (Alesina and Dollar, 
2000, Wright, 2009, Neumayer, 2002, Alesina and Weder, 2002, Knack, 2004).   
 
This kind of corruption-related aid conditionality has been developed most strikingly by the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), a US aid agency established under the Bush 
administration.  Potential MCC recipient countries must score higher than the median compared 
with peers in the same income category on at least one-half of a set of governance criteria.  Of 
these, ‘control of corruption’, measured according to the WGI, has special status as a mandatory 
prerequisite.  The MCC appears to have been effective in promoting corruption control through this 
method.  Research shows that countries with a reasonably good chance of gaining access to the 
MCC fight corruption more effectively than other potential candidates (Ohler et al., 2012, Dreher et 
al., 2012).  Moreover, MCC has begun to operate as a reputational intermediary, with other donors 
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using the signal and granting more aid to countries that have signed compacts with the MCC (Ohler 
et al., 2012).   
 
However, the MCC relies on external indicators of the control of corruption.  These governance 
indicators are a rather imperfect signal of commitment to fighting corruption.  They tend to be based 
largely on perceptions of corruption and on ‘expert accounts’, making them vulnerable to charges of 
subjectivity, lack of comparability across time and countries, and selection bias.  Moreover, on an 
issue where political will and leadership are of key importance, such indicators may not provide a 
very accurate guide to the current government’s commitment to fighting corruption.  By contrast, 
EITI implementation, by virtue of being so onerous and costly, may be a more credible way for 
governments to demonstrate that they are committed to fighting corruption.  EITI implementation is 
itself an explicit – and ongoing - commitment to greater transparency and accountability.  As a 
result, we would expect donors to start conditioning aid on EITI implementation, and governments 
to start signing up to EITI as a way of improving their reputation with the international community 
and accessing such aid.    
 
On the donor side, there is evidence that many IOs, donors and lenders, including the United 
Nations, IMF, World Bank, European Union and African Union, actively promote EITI to resource-
rich country governments.  The EITI secretariat is also explicit about the benefits that countries can 
expect to gain from joining, listing them in its core documents.  Some of these benefits derive from 
efficiency gains, such as the value of having more regular or predictable tax revenues.  Others are 
more reputational:  an increase in foreign direct investment, for example, might come about as a 
result of improved perceptions of the business environment.  EITI also lists ‘reputation management’ 
explicitly, although it describes this primarily as an inward-looking concept, pertaining to the 
government’s reputation with its own population rather than with the international community.   
 
From the perspective of resource-rich governments, the use of EITI as a condition for accessing aid 
might make it worthwhile to commit to transparency.  We assume that governments implement EITI 
when they expect to derive significant benefits from membership – e.g., in terms of aid - which make 
it worthwhile to incur the costs and risks of joining.  Aid is a short-term gain that gives governments 
discretionary power over additional resources, and hence may compensate for forgone corruption 
rents.   
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However, governments will face different balances of costs and benefits depending on the prior 
level of corruption in the country and their degree of commitment to reducing it.  Not all 
governments will find it worthwhile to ‘pay’ for the signal by embarking on EITI implementation.  For 
highly corrupt governments that wish to continue being corrupt, for example, EITI implementation 
does not make sense.  It would either expose evidence of corruption and make leaders vulnerable 
to punishment of some kind (e.g., criminal prosecution, political opposition, loss of an election), or it 
would constrain future corruption opportunities, thereby causing them to forgo revenues.  This may 
explain why some resource-rich but highly corrupt countries have never shown an interest in 
implementing EITI – for example, Angola, the original target country for the ‘Publish What You Pay’ 
campaign.  Such countries are typically not very integrated into the international community, and 
hence are not exposed to anti-corruption norms (Sandholtz and Gray, 2003).  EITI may also be non-
viable in countries with weak or non-existent governments, where corruption levels are high, but 
they are unable to maintain sufficient order to achieve EITI implementation.  This raises some 
doubts about the transformative power of the EITI for the most corrupt countries.   
 
On the other hand, for governments that are seriously committed to reducing corruption, or that 
think they have an unjustly poor reputation for being corrupt, the costs of implementing EITI will be 
low and the benefits potentially great.  Committing to implement EITI is therefore a truthful signal by 
which clean governments can distinguish themselves from less clean governments, build a 
reputation for integrity and thereby unlock economic benefits.  This may also explain why some 
countries – e.g., Myanmar - seek to join immediately after a change of government, as the incoming 
government looks for ways to distinguish itself from its predecessor and access resources with 
which it can reward voters.   
 
Although we cannot test whether governments join because they expect to receive aid, which would 
require a much more detailed exercise in process-tracing, Eigen offers evidence that implementing 
governments at least expect EITI to yield concrete benefits. This suggests that donors and lenders 
may offer such incentives explicitly, at least in some cases: 
 
“A Nigerian minister, recently commenting for the first time on her country's acquiring an attractive 
credit rating, attributed a sovereign debt rating in substantial part to the reputational effect of its 
energetic application of EITI to uncover, for public scrutiny, the previously hidden fiscal flows of the 
oil and gas industry.”(Eigen, 2006-07) 
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Ölcer meanwhile refers to the view of a member of the Cameroon Publish What You Pay coalition 
that there was a perception that the government was using EITI to gain Heavily Indebted Poor 
Country (HIPC) status and thereby become more eligible for special assistance from the IMF and 
World Bank (although this is not formally one of the IMF’s requirements for HIPC status) (Ölcer, 
2009).  Further, a leaked cable from the US embassy in Yemen reporting on a dialogue with donors 
about governance objectives, published by wikileaks, states that “one of the primary donor 
recommendations was that the ROYG join the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) at 
the soonest possible opportunity.”7  This evidence lends weight to the argument that some countries 
join because they expect to receive aid and other forms of support.  Although we cannot claim to 
have stronger evidence about governments’ motivations for joining EITI, we do seek to demonstrate 
that there is a relationship between EITI implementation and aid receipts.  We postulate the 
following hypotheses about this relationship.   
 
Hypothesis 1a:  Countries that are highly corrupt and have access to substantial natural resource 
rents are less likely to participate in EITI than countries which are moderately corrupt and/or have 
access to lower natural resource rents. 
 
Hypothesis 1b:  Countries that implement EITI receive an increased amount of foreign aid.   
 
Hypothesis 1c:  The amount of aid that implementing countries receive is greater the further the 
country has progressed with EITI implementation. 
 
AID CONDITIONALITY: METHOD AND RESULTS 
 
Data is taken from the World Bank World Development Indicators, Transparency International and 
from EITI.  The sample size is a maximum of 185 countries, although data limitations reduce this for 
many regressions.  We do not include developed countries in the regressions for the impact of 
joining EITI, hence Norway is not part of the sample for countries that are compliant and the United 
States and Australia are excluded from the sample of countries that commit to EITI.  We use the 
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) as an annual measure of the level of 
corruption in a country.  Although other measures of corruption are available, such as the World 
                                               
7
 See http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=06SANAA146.  Accessed 4 October 2012. 
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Bank’s ‘Control of Corruption’ score within the Worldwide Governance Indicators, the CPI is the 
most widely known and used indicator of country-level corruption.  The CPI was launched in 1995, 
while EITI was established only in 2002.  We consider the impact on country CPI scores of different 
stages of EITI implementation – commitment, first report and candidacy – both over time and 
compared to a matched-pair sample.  A summary of the data is provided in Table 2. 
 
Table 2.  Data Summary 
 
Aid is the aid flows from all DAC countries. Ethnic is ethnic fractionalization of a country, based on Alesina et 
al. (2003) and supplemented with data from CIA The World Factbook. CPI is the Transparency International 
Corruption Perceptions Index. Commit, First Report, Candidate, and Compliant are categories of dummy 
variables set at one in the year that a country chooses to commit, publishes its first EITI report, becomes a 
candidate or becomes compliant. 
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Aid (US$ millions) 1656 324.0 879.0 0 22000.0 
LnAid 1628 14.6 8.02 0 23.82 
Population (thousands) 1656 35,500.0 132,000.0 67.8 1,340,000.0 
LnPop 1656 15.71 1.87 11.12 21.01 
LnPop^2 1656 250.45 58.35 123.74 441.6 
GDP per capita 1651 9944.9 15548.65 0 118218.8 
LnGDP_PC 1593 8.7 1.31 5.44 11.4 
LnGDP_PC^2 1593 77.38 22.62 29.56 129.89 
Debt service (US$ 
millions) 
1656 16,100 48,100.0 0 549,000 
LnDebtServ 1656 22.27 1.82 0 27.03 
Ethnic 1611 0.44 0.26 0 0.93 
Natural Resources (% 
GDP) 
1656 10.42 19.44 0 206.51 
CPI 1377 4.15 2.17 1 9.9 
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Natural resources x 
Inverse CPI 
1368 7.35 14.73 0 169.34 
Commit 1665 0.02 0.15 0 1 
First Report 1665 0.01 0.11 0 1 
Candidate 1665 0.02 0.14 0 1 
Compliant 1665 0.00 0.05 0 1 
 
Using a Cox proportional hazard model (Cox, 1972), we can examine the factors that determine the 
decision to participate in EITI over time; these results are presented in Table 3. The Cox 
proportional hazard model removes each country when it carries out one of the four stages of EITI 
implementation, i.e., when it commits to implement EITI, publishes its first report, becomes a 
candidate or achieves compliance.  In the Cox model, this is known as the time to ‘failure’.  We 
control for factors that have been shown by others to affect the decision to join EITI, such as ethnic 
fractionalization and the proportion of natural resource rents (Pitlik et al., 2010, Alesina et al., 2003). 
 
Table 3.  Cox Proportional hazard model of commitment to EITI (failure) 
 
LnAid is the log of DAC countries total aid in current US Dollars. GDPYoY is the year-on-year growth rate of 
GDP based on current US Dollars, LnGDP_PC log of GDP per capita in Current US Dollars, LnPop is the log 
of population, Ethnic is a measure of ethnic fractionalization in the country based on Alesina et al. (2003). 
Natural resources is natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP divided by 10. InvCPI is Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions index, inverted so that 10 is the most corrupt and 1 is least corrupt.  
 
Commit First Report Candidacy Compliant 
LnAid 0.102 (1.57) 0.492 (2.41)** 0.218 (1.69)* 0.306 (1.25) 
LnPop 0.017 (-0.14) -0.338 (-1.91)* -0.144 (-0.99) -0.336 (-1.52) 
GDPYoY 7.480 (3.76)*** -3.818 (-0.86) 6.676 (1.89)* 26.664 (4.16)*** 
LnGDP_PC 
-0.532 (-
3.03)*** 
-0.348 (-1.59) 
-0.453 (-
2.25)** 
-0.887 (-2.68)*** 
Ethnic 2.275 (2.56)** 1.901 (1.85)* 
1.561 
(1.98)** 
-3.292 (-1.65)* 
Natural 0.878 (1.05) 2.215 (3.85)*** 1.356 2.806 (1.75)* 
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Resources (1.99)** 
InvCPI 0.238 (1.05) 0.360 (1.21) 0.431 (1.54) -0.043 (-0.07) 
InvCPI x 
Natural 
Resources 
-0.091 (-0.84) 
-0.256 (-
3.47)*** 
-0.141 (-
1.66)* 
-.276 (-1.25) 
Failures 29 20 32 5 
N 1269 1269 1269 1269 
Clustered Y Y Y Y 
Wald Chi2 97.56 27.68 49.69 64.29 
 
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level and * significant at the 10% level. 
 
We test for the hypothesis that extremely corrupt countries with high levels of natural resources will 
be resistant to joining, showing that the decision to join is tempered by the level of corruption and 
the level of natural resources (H1a).  In other words, countries which stand to lose too much from 
EITI implementation, in terms of forgone corrupt revenues, will not join.  We find that increasing 
levels of natural resource rents lead to a positive effect on the decision to participate at all four 
stages, in line with prior research (Pitlik et al., 2010).  It is statistically significant at the 1% level for 
publication of the first report, at the 5% level for candidacy and at the 10% level for compliance. 
Higher levels of corruption are generally associated with a greater likelihood to participate for three 
of the four implementation stages, with compliance showing a small negative effect.  However, this 
is not statistically significant.  Note that here we have inverted the index so that a score of 10 is the 
most corrupt.  This allows us to examine the effect of increasing corruption and increasing natural 
resource rents. 
 
We find evidence that the most corrupt countries with access to high levels of natural resources do 
not join, in support of H1a.  The coefficient on the product of natural resource rents and corruption is 
negative in all four stages and is statistically significant at the 1% level for the first report and at the 
10% level for the decision to become a candidate.  By inverting the corruption scale and dividing the 
natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP, we create an index that runs from 1 to 100 
(because natural resource rents are sometimes more than 100% of GDP, this is not strictly true, but 
the general principle is valid). Thus very corrupt and natural resource rich countries score high on 
this variable.  
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It is likely that countries which commit to EITI but manage to go no further are those that seek to 
build a reputation for fighting corruption without making the necessary changes – i.e., countries that 
are not truly committed to fighting corruption but seek to ‘fake it’ in order to achieve the associated 
benefits.  This would explain why the coefficient for the natural resource rents and corruption is 
lowest for committers.  It is higher for first reporters than for candidates, which may reflect the fact 
that first reports are a more tangible sign of progress than even candidacy, and there are fewer first 
reports than there are candidates. 
 
We also find evidence that an increase in aid is associated with the decision to participate (H1b).  
This effect is positive for all four stages; it is statistically significant at the 5% level for publication of 
the first report and at the 10% level for the decision to become a candidate.  However, we also wish 
to examine whether further progress towards implementation is rewarded more (H1c).  Table 4 
shows a panel regression looking at the determinants of the log amount of aid in US Dollars with 
country fixed effects and clustered standard errors.  It is primarily concerned with the impact of the 
different stages of EITI participation on aid flows to countries.  
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Table 4.  Determinants of aid 
 
LnAid is the log of DAC countries total aid in current US Dollars, Commit, First Report, Candidate, and 
Compliant are categories of dummy variables set at one in the year that a country chooses to commit, writes, 
its first EITI report, becomes a candidate or becomes compliant to the EITI standards. The subscripts 
represent years, with t0 being the year that a country participates in the stage of EITI. LnDebtServ is the log of 
total debt service costs in current US Dollars. CPI is Transparency International’s Corruption Perception 
index, LnGDP_PC is the log of GDP per capita in Current US Dollars, LnPop is the log of the population, 
LnGDP_PC^2 is the square of the log of the GDP per capita and LnPop^2 is the square of the log of the 
population. 
 
Aid Aid Aid Aid Aid 
Committ-1 -0.272 (-0.77) 
   
0.391 (1.07) 
Committ0 -0.555 (-1.27) 
   
-0.256 (-0.57) 
Committ+1 -0.517 (-1.12) 
   
-0.457 (-1) 
Committ+2 -0.245 (-0.66) 
   
-0.197 (-0.46) 
First Reportt-1 
 
0.515 (1.41) 
  
-0.033 (-0.1) 
First Reportt0 
 
1.264 (2.35)** 
  
0.43 (1.06) 
First Reportt+1 
 
1.441 (2.44)** 
  
0.574 (1.43) 
First Reportt+2 
 
0.899 (1.81)* 
  
-0.341 (-0.63) 
Candidacyt-1 
  
0.932 (2.27)** 
 
1 .08 (2.55)** 
Candidacyt0 
  
1.437 (2.71)*** 
 
1.597 (2.76)*** 
Candidacyt+1 
  
1.71 (2.58)** 
 
1.492 (2.21)** 
Candidacyt+2 
  
2.083 (2.4)** 
 
1.145 (1.23) 
Compliantt-1 
   
2.191 (2.86)*** 1.651 (1.89)* 
Compliantt0 
   
4.734 (4.15)*** 4.262 (3.08)*** 
LnDebtServ -0.295 (-1.14) -0.301 (-1.18) -0.294 (-1.16) -0.304 (-1.18) -0.299 (-1.18) 
CPI -1.304 (-1.95) -1.333 (-1.98) -1.31 (-1.96)* -1.312 (-1.96)* -1.322 (-1.96)* 
LnGDP_PC 10.87 (0.65) 10.113 (0.6) 7.444 (0.44) 8.627 (0.51) 6.329 (0.37) 
LnPop 
-200.8  
(-4.29)*** 
-197.0  
(-4.25)*** 
-191.5 (-4.24)*** 
-204.9 (-
4.36)*** 
-198.5 (-
4.19)*** 
LnGDP_PC^2 6.329 (3.93)*** 
6.185  
(3.88)*** 
5.967 (3.83)*** 6.46 (4)*** 6.209 (3.78)*** 
LnPop^2 -1.057 (-1.14) -1.013 (-1.1) -0.875 (-0.94) -0.946 (-1.02) -0.829 (-0.88) 
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Constant 
1585.6 
(4.11)*** 
1565.6 
(4.09)*** 
1546.5 (4.14)*** 
1628.3 
(4.19)*** 
1602.5 
(4.12)*** 
Fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y 
N 1051 1051 1051 1051 1051 
R
2
 0.154 0.156 0.16 0.158 0.163 
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level and * significant at the 10% level. 
 
We find that the earliest stage of EITI participation, commitment, is not rewarded.  There is no 
evidence of statistically significant shifts in aid associated with commitment.  Perhaps commitment 
to EITI is an insufficient signal of determination to reduce corruption.  However, there are positive 
shifts in aid prior to and after a country has published its first EITI report, a much more meaningful 
signal, and the boost in aid is statistically significant at the 5% level.  There is a slightly larger effect 
with candidacy, with statistically significant rises in aid in the year prior to candidacy, the year of 
candidacy and two years thereafter.  The most significant increases occur with full compliance, 
however, with very large boosts in aid immediately before and after compliance.  This effect is 
statistically significant at the 1% level, but should nevertheless be treated with caution given the 
smaller sample size of compliant countries for whom data on aid is available.  Note also that data 
limitations mean we do not know how aid shifts in the years subsequent to compliance.  Including 
all stages of EITI participation in a single regression shows the most statistically significant of the 
intermediate stages appears to be candidacy rather than the publication of the first report.  There 
remains a statistically significant effect with candidacy in three of the years around the event, 
whereas for the first report statistical significance fails to reach even the 10% level.  The results 
support H1c. 
 
The results lend support to the view that donors are engaging in substantial conditionality, although 
it should be noted that it may not just be conditionality on EITI participation.  This period is marked 
by substantial disbursements of aid based on the MCC, which is well known for its conditionality.  It 
is possible that aid is going to countries with generally improving governance, not just EITI 
participation.  However, it would appear that the achievement of progressively more difficult stages 
of EITI implementation is rewarded with increasing levels of aid.  This is consonant with the 
observation that the two-year relative improvement in CPI is highest for the committers who go on to 
become compliant or publish their first report as shown in Figures 2A and 2B.   The direction of 
causality is not certain: countries which improve more on the CPI may be more likely to become 
compliant or publish their first report, rather than vice versa.  However, the fact that aid appears 
conditional on these latter stages of implementation would support the view that donors are looking 
 20 
for tangible improvement – either in the form of improved CPI scores or in the form of EITI 
implementation. 
Figures 2A and 2B: Two-year relative CPI change post-commitment based on whether 
countries go on to write their first report or become compliant 
 
 
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
EITI first reporters EITI non-first reporters
N = 24 
N = 3 
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*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level and * significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
IMPACT OF EITI IMPLEMENTATION ON CORRUPTION 
 
Much research suggests that the promise of membership of international clubs can be an important 
factor in motivating countries to undertake reforms that they otherwise find too politically costly or 
unappealing.  The transformational power of conditionality requirements is frequently linked to the 
nature, complexity and length of the accession process: conditionality is more effective in achieving 
substantive change where it is more ambitious and where compliance is more carefully monitored.  
Thus, the Central and East European countries benefited from a long and thorough process of 
harmonization with the European Union’s acquis communitaire (Grabbe, 2006, Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier, 2004).  Similarly, the countries that engage in the most rigorous accession process to 
the World Trade Organization experience the greatest post-accession gains in trade (Allee and 
Scalera, 2012).  If accession is complex and lengthy, then it is more difficult to ‘fake’ compliance by 
ticking the right boxes, for example by passing the right laws but failing to implement them.     
 
We suggest that the process of implementing EITI has a substantive effect in terms of reducing 
corruption because the implementation process builds institutions which increase accountability.  
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
EITI compliant*** EITI non-compliant
N = 10 
N = 17 
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This reasoning draws on a key academic model of corruption, which argues that corruption occurs 
when public officials have discretionary power and monopoly power but lack accountability 
(Klitgaard, 1988).   These two types of power are necessary for governing, but raise risks that power 
will be abused; therefore accountability is necessary to check the abuse of power.  Discretionary 
power, i.e., the power to alter or shape a decision, is clearly a necessary condition for a public 
official to engage in corruption.  Without it, there would be no point in another agent seeking to 
influence him or her.  Even if offered a bribe or some kind of private benefit, he or she would not 
have the power to alter policy outcomes in such a way as to benefit the bribe-payer.  Monopoly 
power allows the corrupt public official to solicit bribes in the knowledge that the other party cannot 
simply find another official to execute the policy – either without a bribe or for a cheaper bribe.  
Discretionary and monopoly power therefore create the opportunity for a public official to engage in 
corruption.  However, many public officials utilize such power without doing so corruptly.  According 
to Klitgaard, this is because they face accountability.  It is only when there is an absence of 
accountability that public officials exercise their power for private ends unchecked by scrutiny, 
complaint, or the threat of punishment.   
The implication is that, if accountability can be improved, the potential for corruption will be reduced.  
Klitgaard’s model raises a number of issues which are beyond the scope of this article, but this 
theoretical claim about the relationship between accountability and corruption is supported by a 
considerable body of literature which shows that corruption is negatively associated with good 
governance and democracy (Sandholtz and Koetzle, 2000).  Note that our argument is not that EITI 
reduces corruption because it increases transparency per se, although many scholars do associate 
greater transparency with better governance (Stiglitz, 2002), but rather because it increases 
accountability through its long multi-stakeholder implementation process.  
 
Kolstad and Wiig examine the impact of EITI on corruption levels, and also argue that transparency 
in itself is not a sufficient condition for reducing corruption (Kolstad and Wiig, 2009). They suggest 
that transparency must be accompanied by other policies if it is to have the desired effect.  Other 
recent work also shows that active civil society can reduce corruption by increasing societal 
accountability providing other conditions are met, including political competition, press freedom and 
government transparency (Grimes, 2012).  We agree that transparency alone may be ineffective at 
reducing corruption, but we argue that EITI implementation involves much more than transparency.  
As well as improving transparency (which facilitates accountability), the implementation process 
also builds institutional capacity for holding governments to account, opens up channels for civil 
society to influence government, and helps the diffusion of anti-corruption norms.  
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In the EITI implementation process, the establishment of a multi-stakeholder group (MSG) is the 
critical factor which increases accountability.  It opens a channel for dialogue among various 
stakeholders, bringing corporations, governments, CSOs, the media and politicians together in a 
way that is unprecedented in some implementing countries.  As such, it improves the public’s ability 
to hold government to account over the way that it sells the country’s resources.  The EITI 
implementation process empowers civil society actors to comment on the performance of the 
government within a clear framework of expectations, as well as giving legitimacy to those 
expectations.  Thus, CSOs can use ‘naming and shaming’ tactics, as they do elsewhere, to 
encourage states and corporations to comply with the standards (Keck and Sikkink, 1998).   
 
The creation of the MSG may also have important spillover effects.  The MSG provides CSOs with 
status and access, helping them to build capacity in environments where civil society is traditionally 
weak.  Thus, once a country has embarked upon EITI implementation, it is more likely to move 
towards other governance and transparency reforms.  Evidence from countries that have 
implemented EITI supports this proposition.  For example, in Nigeria, EITI implementation has 
prompted much broader scrutiny of the natural resources sector than that required by EITI, including 
the commissioning of 10 years of retrospective audits of national accounts.  These audits revealed 
that $2.6 billion dollars’ worth of revenues were unaccounted for and that there were numerous 
irregularities in the process for allocating oil licenses.  Such revelations are likely to increase 
scrutiny of future contracts and may deter misconduct.  Moreover, Nigeria’s EITI implementation 
process has helped to foster a broader civil society movement for government transparency, 
ultimately leading to the passage of a Freedom of Information Act.  It has also increased scrutiny 
over companies; the work of the reconciliation team – external auditors who seek to reconcile the 
revenues declared by governments with the payments disclosed by companies – drew attention to 
the fact that there were several weaknesses in the tax authorities’ system for assessing tax liability.  
Ultimately, this led to more tax being collected from those companies, an outcome which, as one 
external auditor interviewed for this research pointed out, helped to garner support from politicians 
eager to earn political capital on being seen to make companies pay more tax. 
 
In Indonesia, the CSOs involved in implementing EITI have embarked on a number of initiatives 
beyond the scope of the multi-stakeholder group, lobbying government for revisions to the oil and 
gas law and the freedom of information act.  The latter might extend the reach of transparency to all 
areas of government, far beyond the extractives sector.  In Tanzania, EITI implementation has given 
significant momentum to the public debate on the resource sector.  An evaluation of the impact of 
EITI also found that the process has created links to the broader governance reform process and 
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allowed governments to identify institutional weaknesses (Caspary, 2012).  Other IOs have also 
helped to extend the benefits of EITI by funding spin-off projects - for example, the World Bank has 
set up a Multi-Donor Trust Fund to provide technical assistance to countries implementing – or 
considering implementing – EITI.  This has, for example, supported peer-to-peer learning and 
knowledge exchange among EITI candidate countries Yemen and Kazakhstan. Revenue Watch 
Institute has produced a governance index which examines wider issues around how revenues are 
managed, giving the civil society stakeholders more ways to hold the government to account.  The 
Soros Foundation has funded training for CSOs aimed at helping them to understand how the 
extractives industries work, so as to better equip them to evaluate EITI reports and ask the right 
questions of other stakeholders.  A survey of CSOs participating in EITI found that the organizations 
themselves consider their participation in the policy dialogue to be one of the most successful 
aspects of the implementation process (Dykstra, 2011).  It is difficult to quantify the impact of multi-
stakeholder group activities on accountability and on reducing corruption.  However, the examples 
support the claim that EITI implementation creates conditions in which accountability is likely to 
increase and corruption to fall, hence our second hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2:  For countries that participate in EITI, the level of perceived corruption falls. 
 
CORRUPTION IMPACT: METHOD AND RESULTS 
 
We find that the decision to commit, to write a first report, or to become a candidate has a positive 
impact on a country’s CPI score in the two years following the event.8  This result contrasts with that 
of Ölcer, who analyses the impact of commitment on CPI levels and finds no significant effect; 
however, it is only in the last two years that the sample has become large enough to be amenable 
to statistical testing (Ölcer, 2009).  In order to control for time-specific factors, as well as the impact 
of natural resources, level of development, geographic location and level of corruption, we match 
the EITI joiners with a matched sample of paired non-joiners to EITI.  Each sample country is paired 
with another country based on three criteria: the CPI, the level of natural resource rents as a 
percentage of GDP – since increasing oil rents are associated with increasing corruption (Arezki 
and Bruckner, 2011) - and geographic distance.  The paired sample excludes any countries that 
commit to EITI in the analysis period.  Sample selection is with replacement.  Matching takes place 
in the year of the EITI action (commitment, first report or candidacy).  CPI is known to be related to 
                                               
8
 While TI advises against comparing individual CPI scores on a year-on-year basis, we take the mean of the sample 
countries, which should result in comparable effects.   
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factors such as GDP per capita and measures of government effectiveness, hence these factors 
should also be covered by this matching process (Pitlik et al., 2010).  In Table 5 we show that for 
candidates, first reporters and committers, there are absolute improvements in CPI and relative 
improvements in CPI, a result which is statistically significant at the 10% level for candidacy and 
commitment, although not for first reporters.  Note that we do not calculate the impact for those 
countries which have reached compliance as the sample size is too small.  
 
Figure 3 shows the relative shift in the CPI for EITI candidates against the shift in the CPI of the 
paired sample from two years prior to candidacy to two years afterwards.  Owing to data limitations, 
this is a slightly different paired sample from that used in Table 5; the matching takes place two 
years prior to the candidacy rather than in the year of candidacy.  It should be noted that the effect 
of commitment and candidacy are nearly cumulative overall.  Only two countries out of 29 achieve 
candidacy in the same year as commitment.  The mean and median gaps between commitment and 
candidacy are two years.  The sum of the two effects in Table 5 is a cumulative relative 
improvement of 0.276 points in the CPI for EITI committers and candidates.  This is reasonably 
close to the 0.235 point improvement seen in Figure 3. The difference of 0.235 points is statistically 
significant at the 5% level.  
 
Table 5.  Impact of EITI actions on corruption 
 
CPI is the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, the subscripts represent the 
year of the EITI-related action with t0 being the year of action. Student t-test based on the standard 
deviation of all CPI 2-year changes in the period when EITI is active. Commit, First Report and 
Candidate are when a country chooses to commit to EITI, publishes its first EITI report and 
becomes a candidate for EITI standards. Paired sample is matched based on geographic proximity, 
CPI score and natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP in the year of the EITI action. 
  
Commit First report Candidate 
EITI countries CPIt0 2.519 2.706 2.569 
 
CPIt2 2.574 2.756 2.645 
 
Change 0.056 0.050 0.076 
Paired sample CPIt0 2.585 2.669 2.590 
 
CPIt2 2.500 2.588 2.531 
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Change -0.085 -0.081 -0.059 
EITI – Paired 
sample Change 
0.141 0.131 0.135 
T-test 
 
* 
 
* 
 
N 27 16 29 
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level and * significant at the 10% level. 
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Figure 3.  Impact of EITI candidacy relative to paired sample 
 
CPI is the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index. Candidacy is when a country becomes a 
candidate for EITI standards. Paired sample is matched based on geographic proximity, CPI score and 
natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP in the year of the EITI action. 
 
 
 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND REDUCED CORRUPTION 
 
In line with our argument that EITI implementation reduces corruption to the extent that it increase 
accountability, we expect to find that the creation and activities of the multi-stakeholder groups lead 
to a reduction in the level of corruption.   
 
Hypothesis 3:  For countries with stronger accountability, there will be a greater reduction in 
corruption levels upon implementing EITI. 
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We use the Worldwide Governance Indicators Voice and Accountability (VAE) measure and 
assume that where there is a higher level of VAE relative to the corruption level, committing to EITI 
leads to a larger decline in corruption.  The underlying assumption is that a society in which 
accountability is greater will be better able to benefit from the EITI process.   
 
Taking the difference between the VAE and the CPI in the year of commitment to EITI (having 
adjusted both to a range between 0 and 1), we find that the 14 countries with the highest gap 
between the VAE and CPI have an aggregate improvement of 0.15 points in the CPI, while the 14 
lowest see a decline of 0.04 points in the two years following commitment (see Table 6).  The 
difference between the top half and the bottom half is statistically significant at the 5% level9.    
 
It is possible that such a gap between a high VAE and relatively poor CPI leads to a decline in the 
level of corruption regardless of EITI implementation.  We test this using a panel regression, 
controlling for fixed effects, year effects and the absolute level of CPI. This finds that whilst a gap 
between VAE and CPI is consonant with a rise in the CPI over the following two years, the rise is 
only statistically significant where the country has chosen to join EITI.  This holds true at the 5% 
level for a continuous variable for EITI post joining and at the 10% level for the one-year effect of a 
decision to commit.  
 
 
 
 
Table 6: How accountability affects the impact of EITI on corruption 
 
The dependent variable is the 2-year change in the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI). The independent variables are the CPI – the World Governance Indicators Voice and Accountability 
measure (VAE). The CPI and VAE are both rebased to a 100 point scale and the VAE score is subtracted 
from the CPI score. EITI_C is a dummy variable equal to one if a country chooses to commit to EITI. EITI is a 
dummy variable equal to one if a country chooses to commit to EITI and in all subsequent years. 
 
                                               
9
 This is the raw change in the CPI rather than a relative change compared to a paired sample since the aim is to examine 
the effect of the gap between a relatively high VAE and low CPI.  
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CPI Δ 2Yr CPI Δ2 Yr 
CPI-VAE -0.464 (-1.00) -0.532 (-1.17) 
EITI x CPI-VAE -0.421(-2.40)** 
 EITI_C x CPI-VAE  -0.269 (-1.77)* 
CPI -0.806(-13.21)*** -0.799 (-13.18)*** 
 Constant 3.142 (9.68)*** 3.104 (9.64)*** 
Year 
dummies Y Y 
Fixed effects Y Y 
N 997 997 
R2 0.483 0.481 
 
 
Endogeneity 
 
It is impossible to attribute causation in the relationship between EITI implementation and the 
reduction of corruption.  Whilst the matching of CPI, geographic proximity and natural resource 
rents can control for some factors, we cannot rule out that the improvement in absolute and relative 
CPI reflects a different causal factor that is also driving EITI implementation.  One obvious factor 
that could be causing both is a shift in political regime, such as the developments taking place in 
2012 in Myanmar.  We do know that EITI membership is correlated with a small but measurable 
reduction in corruption and this accords with evidence about steps taken to increase accountability 
in the field.  The results would suggest that EITI is not used deceptively to qualify for aid even as 
corruption levels worsen.  
Even the finding that EITI improves corruption levels where a country has a higher level of Voice 
and Accountability (VAE) only indicates that EITI has a contributory role and does not prove 
causation.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
We find evidence that countries attract additional aid when they implement the EITI standard.  We 
cannot demonstrate conclusively that the expectation of receiving such benefits motivated these 
countries to join, but we have provided some evidence that governments see EITI membership as a 
way of building a reputation for seeking to improve governance with the international community.   
Part of EITI’s value for governments lies in the way that it allows them to distinguish themselves 
from their peers.  However, EITI’s leverage will only work on governments that care about building 
such a reputation.  On the donor side, we note that many donors have begun to condition aid on 
indicators of governance, and we suggest that EITI implementation offers a much more credible 
signal of commitment than such indicators.  EITI therefore serves as a reputational intermediary.  It 
provides a way for governments to build a reputation for being committed to achieving greater 
transparency and accountability.  It helps donors to overcome the asymmetric information problem 
that they have in assessing the anti-corruption efforts of recipient countries, by outsourcing the 
tasks of judging a government’s credibility and monitoring compliance directly to the country’s multi-
stakeholder group, which is supported by the EITI framework and secretariat.   
 
Although countries may be motivated to implement EITI partly for these instrumental reasons, we 
find that implementation is nevertheless associated with an improvement in the level of corruption, 
as measured by the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index.  The effective is 
cumulative, growing as countries progress through different stages of EITI implementation, and the 
results are statistically significant.  We suggest that this reflects the impact of the EITI 
implementation process in terms of increasing accountability over governments more broadly, rather 
than the effect of greater revenue transparency per se.  However, further research in this area could 
help to arrive at a more detailed understanding of how EITI implementation improves accountability 
and reduces corruption.  
 
Finally, our results have implications for how EITI might develop over time.  As more and more 
countries sign up, the value of being compliant – relative to others – will decline.  We might thus 
expect the appetite for joining – and perhaps the incentive to remain compliant - to decline over 
time.  Such an effect is evident for the MCC: once countries have attained eligibility, the incentive to 
continue reforming is weak.  The EITI Board’s constant  efforts to raise the bar and ratchet the 
standards upwards is thus a sensible way of ensuring that EITI remains relevant as more countries 
join.  However, the fact that most of the G8 countries have recently committed to implement EITI 
suggests that the initiative has now become a minimum standard which resource-rich countries (at 
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least, most of them) feel compelled to implement in order to be seen as legitimate members of the 
international community. 10  As such, EITI represents an innovative model of global governance 
which has used voluntary standards and a tripartite implementation mechanism to create a new 
international norm.   This model might be replicated in other areas where there is a gap in global 
and national regulation.   
  
  
                                               
10
 The United States is already implementing EITI; the United Kingdom, France and Italy have all committed to do so; 
Germany is to pilot the process; Canada is to introduce Publish what you Pay legislation; and Russia and Japan are to 
become EITI supporters. 
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